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The Evolving GPA: Lessons of Experience and Prospects for the Future 
Arwel Davies* 
1. Introduction 
The WTO Agreement on Government Procurement occupies a central position as the most significant 
international instrument of procurement market liberalization. Its primary focus is the elimination of 
discriminatory laws and practices resulting in compartmentalized procurement markets and 
impermissible distinctions between domestic and foreign goods, services and suppliers based solely 
on origin and nationality. Procurement at the WTO is therefore first and foremost an issue of trade 
liberalization, market access and the avoidance of protectionism.1  
The WTO’s web-based information on the GPA indicates that procurement markets open to 
competition among suppliers of the GPA Parties are ‘currently valued at up to $1.7 trillion dollars 
annually’2 with around 75% of this value attributable to the EU and the US.3 Beyond this, a wealth of 
introductory information is provided on the GPA’s expanding membership and contract / procuring 
entity coverage, as well as its development from the 1979 ‘Tokyo Round Code on Government 
Procurement’ to the entry into force of the Revised GPA in April 2014. The picture presented in 
justifiably of a success story. While procurement market liberalization remains firmly rooted to the 
optional / plurilateral model, there have been significant gains. Market Access under the Revised GPA 
is estimated to have increased by between $80 billion to $100 billion annually. According to Robert 
Anderson, this results from coverage of 400-500 additional procuring entities, coverage by three 
major Parties of Build Operate Transfer Arrangements, generally expanded coverage of services 
procurement (especially telecommunications) and coverage by all Parties of the full range of 
construction services.4 Information on coverage commitments will become easier to access with the 
launch of the e-GPA portal which provides a single point of access to the market access information.5 
The Revised GPA itself, with which national procurement regimes must comply, has a more logical 
structure and is improved in its content especially in its recognition of electronic forms of 
communication and procurement.  
                                                          
* College of Law, Swansea University. 
1 This is clear from the opening paragraphs of the GPA’s Preamble: 
Recognizing the need for an effective multilateral framework for government procurement, with a view to achieving greater 
liberalization and expansion of, and improving the framework for, the conduct of international trade; Recognizing that 
measures regarding government procurement should not be prepared, adopted or applied so as to afford protection to 
domestic suppliers, goods or services, or to discriminate among foreign suppliers, goods or services; 
2 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gp_gpa_e.htm (visited November 2014). See also, Robert D. Anderson, 
Philippe Pelletier, Kodjo Osei-Lah and Anna Caroline Müller, Assessing the Value of Future Accessions to the WTO 
Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA): Some New Data Sources, Provisional Estimates, and an Evaluative 
Framework for Individual WTO Members Seeking Accession, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2011-15, 6 October 2011, 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201115_e.pdf 
3 Pelletier, Osei-Lah and Müller at 18. 
4 R.D. Anderson, ‘The coming into force of the revised WTO Agreement on Government Procurement, and related 
developments’ (2014) 5 Public Procurement Law Review NA160. It is difficult to comment on the extent of the achievement 
with regard to the market access dimension. This rather depends on whether the aspirations and expectations of negotiators 
were met. The gain in market access opportunities seems to be of the order of 5-10 percent. It therefore seems clear that 
substantial future gains will come more from accessions than from further commitments from existing GPA Parties. It has 
been estimated, for example, that the accession of China alone will yield market access gains in the range of $US 113 and 
289 billion. Pelletier, Osei-Lah and Müller, above note 2 at 13.  
  
5 https://e-gpa.wto.org/ 
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However, membership, while expanded, remains limited. The GPA covers 43 of the WTO’s 160 
WTO Members, a figure which includes the 28 EU Members States and which will shortly increase to 
45 with the accession of Montenegro and New Zealand. The membership is also imbalanced towards 
developed countries, albeit that there is at least the possibility for this position to gradually change. 
Article V of the Revised GPA contains strengthened transitional arrangements for developing and 
least developed WTO Members. Furthermore, some WTO Members which have started the process of 
accession to the GPA are, according to World Bank criteria,6 lower middle income countries 
(Moldova, Kyrgyz Republic, Ukraine). Mongolia and Tajikistan, which have provisions on GPA 
accession in their protocols of accession to the WTO are respectively lower middle income and low 
income countries. Future accessions, in particular by China which submitted its first coverage offer in 
2007, could prompt other states towards membership. Suppliers from other major developing / 
transition economies may petition their governments for the same access to overseas procurement 
markets as that enjoyed by China’s suppliers by reason of GPA membership. It is therefore possible 
that we are on the brink of a period of intense activity towards an expansion in the level and diversity 
of membership.   
Going forward, a total of five Work Programmes are in place which aim to progress negotiating issues 
which could not be fully resolved in the GPA renegotiation.7 These relate to supporting the 
participation of SMEs in procurement; improving the collection and reporting of statistical data 
relating to the GPA; promoting the use of sustainable procurement practices consistently with the 
GPA; addressing restriction and exclusions in coverage commitments and safety standards in 
international procurement.   
The further sections below are divided as follows. Section 2 discusses the GPA’s objectives. These 
can be better understood by locating the GPA within the overall tapestry of procurement regulation 
comprising national regulation and other international instruments. Section 3 discusses the principal 
area which the national case study papers have been asked to comment on – domestic review 
procedures. The role and value of these procedures is discussed and some questions which may have 
slipped under the radar are posed. Do the rulings of the bodies reviewing supplier complaints have to 
be binding on the procuring entity? Must it be possible for the review to eventually come before a 
court? If not, is this position consistent with the United Nations Conference Against Corruption 
(UNCAC)8? Section 4 turns to the new Work Programme on supporting SME participation. The 
economic and social justice rationales for supporting SMEs and, more broadly, enterprises in which 
historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) have a strong stake, are covered. As the Work 
Programme seems to be focused on removing discrimination in this area, the extent to which this can 
be realistically achieved is considered. Section 5 considers a doctrinal development arising from the 
Canada – Renewable Energy9 case. The question is whether procurement and buy national policies 
are carved out of multilateral coverage under the GATT to the extent that has been commonly 
understood. Section 6 concludes.  
                                                          
6 http://data.worldbank.org/country 
7 The Work Programmes are referred to in Appendix 2 of Adoption of the Results of the Negotiations under Article XXIV:7 
of the Agreement on Government Procurement, Following their Verification and Review, as Required by the Ministerial 
Decision of 15 December 2011 (GPA/112), paragraph 5, GPA/113, 2 April 2012. 
8 United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2349. The Convention was adopted by the United Nations  
General Assembly by its resolution 58/4. In accordance with article 68 (1) of the Convention,  
the Convention entered into force on 14 December 2005. The text of the Convention is also  
available at https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/ 
(accessed November 2014). 
9 WT/DS412/AB/R Canada – Certain Measures Affecting the Renewable Energy Generation Sector; WT/DS426/AB/R 
Canada – Measures Relating to the Feed-In Tariff Programme. 
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2. The GPA’s objective/s – trade liberalization, non-discrimination, good governance, integrity, 
efficiency 
What is the GPA for? What are its direct objectives and can GPA membership indirectly or 
incidentally contribute towards the achievement of other objectives? Where and how should the 
boundary between direct objectives and incidental benefits be drawn? As discussed below, the 
answers to these questions emerge not so much from considering the GPA in isolation, but rather from 
the GPA’s relationship with both national procurement regimes, and other international procurement 
instruments.    
As noted, procurement at the WTO is first and foremost an issue of trade liberalization, market access 
and the avoidance of protectionism. The GPA’s primary General Principle in Article IV is non-
discrimination. The more specific rules which require transparent procurement procedures are 
primarily directed towards making discrimination more difficult or easier to monitor and detect.10 For 
several reasons, however, it is appropriate for the GPA to refer to other values and objectives such as 
integrity and efficiency. This is to some extent inevitable because the very same general principles 
and specific transparency based rules which make discrimination more difficult, can also safeguard 
against corruption and contribute towards achievement of value for money. The GPA’s Preamble 
recognizes this connection. While the opening Preamble recitals are devoted to trade liberalization 
and the avoidance of protectionism it is further provided in the third recital that:  
the integrity and predictability of government procurement systems are integral to the efficient 
and effective management of public resources, the performance of the Parties' economies and 
the functioning of the multilateral trading system …         
In a limited sense, it can now be argued that the GPA now pursues the objective of value for 
money which is clearly related to ‘the efficient and effective management of public resources’. 
However, it is probably more accurate to view the recital above as reflecting the potential benefits 
which GPA membership can bring towards achieving value for money, with the precise content of 
this imprecise concept, and exactly how to achieve it, remaining within the domain of national 
policy makers.  
It is possible here to use the analogy of passing the baton in a relay race. Non-discrimination is not 
an end in itself in the trade context unless we attach moral opprobrium to treating foreign suppliers 
differently merely because of their nationality. Rather, non-discrimination is a device to facilitate 
the materialization of the benefits of competition in the market place. Non-discrimination is a 
useful device in this regard, but it is not sufficient in itself. The benefits will only materialize to the 
extent that there is some conception of the efficient use of public resources at the national level. 
An admittedly improbable scenario can be used to illustrate this point. Suppose that a procuring 
entity does not discriminate. Indeed, it places all its contracts with foreign suppliers and 
consistently purchases the most expensive and poorest quality goods and services available in the 
market place. The discrimination norm here, while observed, has not contributed towards its 
ultimate end because the procuring entity has no conception of the efficient use of public 
resources. The question raised is the extent to which international rules need to address the 
achievement of value for money. In terms of regulating this matter, the baton should be passed at 
an early stage, partly because all states have some conception of the efficient use of public 
                                                          
10 R.D. Anderson and S. Arrowsmith, ‘The WTO regime on government procurement: past, present and future’ in S. 
Arrowsmith and R.D. Anderson (eds.) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement: Challenge and Reform (2011) 
Cambridge University Press 3 at 15. 
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resources, and partly because there are legitimate and wide differences in what this means – 
especially in the extent to which procurement is used to achieve horizontal policies, such as the 
advancement of previously disadvantaged groups and support for SMEs. As such, references to 
efficiency can appropriately feature in preamble recitals, but caution should be exercized before 
developing such statements into enforceable specific obligations. Non-discrimination is the GPA’s 
main enforceable obligation, while value for money is among the benefits which GPA membership 
can contribute towards achieving.    
Moving to the GPA’s relationship with other international procurement instruments, many of these 
instruments both replicate the GPA’s rules and share the GPA’s primary concern with trade 
liberalization. This applies most strongly to bilateral / regional trade agreements with procurement 
chapters. On the other hand, other instruments with broadly similar rules to the GPA may not share 
its primary concern with non-discrimination and trade liberalization, or at least may approach these 
concepts from a different perspective.  
Under the GPA, the main barrier to international trade is discrimination itself which is generally 
prohibited for covered procurement. In contrast, the barriers to international trade with which the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement11 is more directly concerned are in the form of 
regulatory voids, deficiencies or divergences. These problems can generate a ‘chilling’ effect on 
international trade. As the Model Law’s Guide to Enactment notes, ‘the ability and willingness of 
suppliers and contractors to sell to foreign governments is hampered by the inadequate or 
divergent state of national procurement legislation in many countries’.12 Expressed in an 
exaggerated manner, markedly divergent national laws could all be non-discriminatory and 
therefore of limited direct concern under the GPA.13 However, this divergence generates the 
chilling effect on international trade of greater concern under the Model Law.  
The idea that the Model Law is not as directly concerned with discrimination as the GPA is 
reinforced by its coverage. It is designed to be applicable to all procurement within enacting 
States14 some of which will inevitably involve discriminatory laws and policies15 which could 
violate the GPA for covered procurement. The somewhat different perspectives of the Model Law 
and the GPA are arguably appropriate and intuitive. More than the GPA, the Model Law is an 
instrument of particular value to states which are developing procurement rules for the first time or 
improving and modernizing their existing rules.16 It is understandable that these states are 
primarily concerned with the integrity of the procurement process and the avoidance of abuse with 
                                                          
11 The full text of the Model Law 2011 and its Guide to Enactment are available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/uncitral_texts/procurement_infrastructure.html visited November 2014. See, Caroline 
Nicholas ‘Work of UNCITRAL on government procurement: purpose, objectives and complementarity with the work of the 
WTO’ in Arrowsmith and Anderson (eds.) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement 746; Caroline Nichols ‘The 2011 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Public Procurement’ (2012) Public Procurement Law Reivew NA 111. 
12 Guide to Enactment (henceforth Guide) 2012 page 2, para. 2. 
13 GPA membership can of course promote convergence in national procurement systems and thereby reduce the extent to 
which regulatory divergence is itself a barrier to trade. Indeed, this is implicit in the GPA’s first Preamble recital: 
‘Recognizing the need for an effective multilateral framework for government procurement, with a view to achieving greater 
liberalization and expansion of, and improving the framework for, the conduct of international trade…’ For a discussion of 
the value of harmonization and related themes, see Christopher Yukins and Steven Schooner, Incrementalism: Eroding the 
Impediments to a Global Public Procurement Market 38 Georgetown Journal of International Law (2007) 529.  
14 Article I of the Model Law declares, ‘This Law applies to all public procurement’. 
15 This is recognized in the following Model Law provisions : 
Article 8. Participation by suppliers or contractors 
1. Suppliers or contractors shall be permitted to participate in procurement  proceedings without regard to nationality, except 
where the procuring entity decides to limit participation in procurement proceedings on the basis of  nationality on grounds 
specified in the procurement regulations or other provisions of law of this State. 
16 Guide, page 2, para. 5. 
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a view to enhancing value for money.17 States can go a considerable way towards enhancing 
integrity and at least some way towards enhancing value for money without opening their 
procurement markets to international competition. Undoubtedly, ‘external liberalization’ will tend 
to produce competition among a deeper pool of suppliers thereby further enhancing value for 
money. International liberalization also brings the possibility of other benefits such as access to 
technology that is not available in the home market.18 However, it may be that many states view 
these benefits as accruing from a potential second phase of procurement liberalization, the first 
phase being devoted to enhanced integrity and value for money through internal competition.19       
Even though instruments such as the Model Law and the GPA may have a different focus or 
primary rationale, there is every reason for these instruments to co-exist in a mutually reinforcing 
manner. This is clearly recognized in the Model Law’s Guide to Enactment which refers to 
ensuring the widest possible use of the Model Law and the consequent need for harmony, in 
particular, with the GPA.20 While the GPA does not refer to the Model Law, it is interesting to note 
that the Appellate Body referred to it in Canada – Renewable Energy. In probing the meaning of 
the term ‘procurement’ in the GATT Article III:8 derogation, it referred not to perhaps the most 
obvious source of inspiration, the GPA, but rather to the 2011 Model Law. It was noted that the 
formal procedures under which governments acquire products ‘typically express principles, such 
as efficiency or transparency’.21  
Perhaps more significantly, the GPA and the Model Law are brought into a mutually reinforcing 
relationship via the reference in both instruments22 to the UNCAC. Article 9.1 of UNCAC requires 
that procurement is ‘based on transparency, competition and objective criteria in decision-making, 
that are effective, inter alia, in preventing corruption’. Article 9.1(d) was of particular relevance to 
the strengthening of the domestic review procedures in the Chapter VIII of the Model Law. The 
Model Law now gives effect to the UNCAC requirement for an ‘effective system of domestic 
review, including an effective system of appeal’. As such, the Model Law 2011 and the GPA are 
now more closely aligned in this respect. A new general principle has also been added to the 
Revised GPA under which procurement should be conducted in a ‘transparent and impartial 
manner that ….avoids conflicts of interest and prevents corrupt practices’.23 This provision reflects 
the realization that GPA membership has always had the potential to promote good governance 
through channels such as ready access to applicable procurement rules and contract opportunities, 
limiting the discretion of procurement officers and independent review of compliance with 
procedural rules.   
                                                          
17 The Guide (page 3, para. 8) refers to ‘value for money and the avoidance of abuse in public procurement’ as the 
‘overarching aims of the Model Law’, without also referring to non-discrimination in this immediate context  
18 The benefits of ‘external liberalization’ is among the themes explored in R.D. Anderson, W.E. Kovacic and A.C. Müller 
‘Ensuring integrity and competition in public procurement markets: a dual challenge for good governance’ in Arrowsmith 
and Anderson (eds.) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement 681.  
19 This suggestion is corroborated by the Pelletier, Osei-Lah and Müller (above note 2) at 24-25. The authors comment that 
countries often note in technical assistance seminars that enhanced competition and good governance can be achieved 
without GPA membership. The authors suggest: ‘The real question is whether the GPA accession process, and continuing 
participation in the Agreement, can stimulate or reinforce the necessary domestic reforms, and introduce a degree of ongoing 
monitoring that helps in maintaining a "clean" and competitive procurement system.’  
20 Guide pages 11-12, section 6. Article 3 of the Model Law provides that Treaty obligations prevail when in conflict with 
the Model Law. 
21 Appellate Body report, above note 9, para. 5.59. 
22 GPA Preamble: Recognizing the importance of transparent measures regarding government procurement, of carrying out 
procurements in a transparent and impartial manner and of avoiding conflicts of interest and corrupt practices, in accordance 
with applicable international instruments, such as the United Nations Convention Against Corruption. 
While the Model Law does not itself refer to UNCAC, there are several references to it in the Guide to Enactment. Page 3, 
para. 8; page 306, para. 1. 
23 Revised GPA Article IV(4). 
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As for the enforceability of the new provisions, it is difficult to accept that panels and the 
Appellate Body will be prepared to engage directly with whether it has been breached. Apart from 
the uncertain scope of the provision, conflicts of interests and (even more so) corruption are very 
sensitive matters. The Appellate Body does not actually engage directly with another sensitive (but 
less sensitive) matter; that of whether a measure is ‘applied so as to afford protection to domestic 
production’. While it is clear that this is an independent legal test which must be considered 
separately under GATT Article III:2 second sentence, no attempt needs to be made to ascertain the 
subjective intent of individual policy makers. The matter is desensitized by considering whether 
protective application can be ascertained from the, ‘design, the architecture, and the revealing 
structure of a measure’.24 Panels are therefore likely to distance themselves from direct 
engagement with alleged conflicts of interest and corruption, choosing instead to view the new 
provision as providing interpretive context for other more specific provisions. As such, the main 
impact of the new provision is likely to be to inform the future development of the specific 
transparency based rules. 
In sum, the GPA remains first and foremost an instrument of trade liberalization. Undoubtedly this 
liberalization can also enhance the achievement of value for money through increased competition 
even though the meaning of this concept and how to achieve it is a matter for national regulation. 
When trade liberalization means that contracts are placed with foreign suppliers, this is not at all 
necessarily at the expense of domestic suppliers. The local capacity to perform large contracts 
might not exist, but existing small firms could benefit from sub-contracting and technology 
transfer.25 Trade liberalization in the procurement context should not have any pejorative 
connotation.  There is also growing understanding of the ways in which GPA membership can 
contribute towards good governance albeit that this has more to do with the emergence of this 
concept than any shift in focus in procurement regulation at the WTO. It is also increasingly 
possible to think about international procurement instruments which may have somewhat different 
primary rationales as each contributing towards a coherent whole. To some extent, the GPA takes 
over the baton from the Model Law. 
3. Enforcement and Remedies under the GPA 
The country studies focus in part on the national implementation of the GPA requirements on enforcement 
and remedies. This section provides an account of these requirements. 
When suppliers consider that the GPA has not been properly implemented, or that it has been breached in 
the context of a particular award procedure, they can take advantage of the requirement to provide for 
domestic review procedures. Significantly, suppliers can resort to these procedures independently of their 
governments so that this form of enforcement is fundamentally different to intergovernmental dispute 
settlement under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). 
The rationale for the obligation in international instruments to provide for domestic review procedures is 
referred to in the Model Law 2011 Guide to enactment: 
An effective challenge mechanism helps to make the Model Law to an important degree self-policing 
and self-enforcing, since it provides an avenue for suppliers and contractors that have a natural 
interest in monitoring procuring entities' compliance with the provisions of the Model Law in each 
procurement procedure. It also helps foster public confidence in the procurement system as a whole. 
An additional function of a challenge mechanism is to act as a deterrent: its existence is designed to 
                                                          
24 WT/DS8,10, 11/AB/R Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages adopted November 1, 1996 page 29. 
25 These are among the themes developed by Pelletier, Osei-Lah and Müller, above note 2.  
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discourage actions or decisions knowingly in breach of the law. For these reasons, a challenge 
mechanism is an essential element of ensuring the proper functioning of the procurement system and 
can promote confidence in that system.26 
In the Revised GPA, the minimum requirements for domestic review procedures are set out in Article 
XVIII:   
Article XVIII:1 Domestic Review Procedures  
1. Each Party shall provide a timely, effective, transparent, and non-discriminatory administrative or 
judicial review procedure through which a supplier may challenge: 
(a) a breach of the Agreement; or 
(b) where the supplier does not have a right to challenge directly a breach of the Agreement under the 
domestic law of a Party, a failure to comply with a Party's measures implementing this Agreement,  
arising in the context of a covered procurement, in which it has, or has had, an interest. The 
procedural rules for all challenges shall be in writing and made generally available. 
The GPA 1994 did not contain paragraph (b) above, so that suppliers apparently had to be given the 
opportunity to challenge ‘a breach of the Agreement’. Some commentators interpreted this language as 
indicating that the GPA was intended to have direct effect in the legal systems of all its Parties.27 Had this 
been correct, national review bodies would be required to apply the GPA itself, rather than national 
implementing measures in the event of a conflict. It is now clear from the inclusion of paragraph (b) that 
direct effect is a matter for individual Parties. Therefore, when the supplier’s complaint is that the GPA has 
not been properly implemented by a state which does not recognize the direct effect of the WTO 
agreements, the appropriate course of action would be for the supplier to petition its government to institute 
intergovernmental proceedings under the DSU.   
In contrast, when the GPA has been properly implemented, but when the relevant national rules have not 
been followed by an entity in a specific procurement, suppliers can usefully have recourse to domestic 
review procedures.  Indeed, the requirement for Parties to provide for these procedures stems from the 
inadequacy of the DSU in providing a meaningful solution where the complaint relates to a specific 
procurement. The timetable for resolving disputes under the DSU is understandably protracted28 and there is 
no provision for interim remedies, such as the suspension of the award procedure, at the start of the dispute. 
Indeed, there would be little point in providing for suspension, unless a panel could order the 
recommencement of the procedure in the event of a breach being confirmed. It is generally understood, 
however, that the standard recommendation under DSU Article 19 has only prospective effect. The 
requirement to ‘bring the [inconsistent] measure into conformity’ is a forward looking remedy which does 
not entail reparations for injury caused by WTO violations.29  
                                                          
26 Guide page 228, para. 2. 
27 T Cottier ‘A Theory of Direct Effect in Global Law’ in Von Bogandy, Mavroidis and Mény (eds.), European Integration 
and International Co-ordination (2002) Kluwer Law International. 
28 The GPA 1994 Article XXII.6 had provided that that, ‘[e]very effort should be made to accelerate the proceedings to the 
greatest possible extent’ and then went on to recommend specific reduced deadlines.  Interestingly, this provision has been 
jettisoned from the Revised GPA, which probably reflects the view that breaches of the GPA in the context of a specific 
procurements can only realistically be challenged at the national level.    
29 See A Davies ‘Reviewing Dispute Settlement at the World Trade Organization: a Time to Reconsider the Role/s of 
compensation’ (2006) 5 World Trade Review 31. 
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In the procurement context, the Trondheim30 case, decided under the Tokyo Round GPA, confirms that 
remedies following intergovernmental proceedings at the WTO cannot have an impact on past conduct. The 
case involved the Norwegian Public Roads Administration which awarded a contract relating to electronic 
toll collection equipment for a toll system around the city of Trondheim to a Norwegian company, Micro 
Design. As limited tendering was used, (then referred to as single tendering) the award was not preceded by 
any competitive tendering procedure. This was challenged by the United States on the basis that the use of 
limited tendering had excluded ‘viable and eager competition from a capable United States supplier’. The 
panel first found that the use of limited tendering was not justified under the governing provisions in effect 
at that time.31 Therefore the national treatment provision then contained in Article II:1 (now Article IV:1) 
was found to have been breached. The panel then considered the remedies which the United States had 
requested:   
4.17 … the Panel noted that all the acts of non-compliance alleged by the United States were acts that 
had taken place in the past. The only way mentioned during the Panel’s proceedings that Norway 
could bring the Trondheim procurement into line with its obligations under the Agreement would be 
by annulling the contract and recommencing the procurement process. The Panel did not consider it 
appropriate to make such a recommendation.  Recommendations of this nature had not been within 
customary practice in dispute settlement under the GATT system and the drafters of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement had not made specific provision that such recommendations be within the 
task assigned to panels under standard terms of reference. Moreover, the Panel considered that in the 
case under examination such a recommendation might be disproportionate, involving waste of 
resources and possible damage to the interests of third parties. 
The panel also noted that proposals had been made in relation to revising the Tokyo Round GPA which were 
intended to ‘address the difficulty felt to exist in obtaining effective redress in respect of complaints about 
specific procurements’.32 The negotiations resulted in revisions to the Uruguay Round GPA which are now 
found in Article XVIII of the Revised GPA 2012. This provision advises that ‘the Party of the procuring 
entity conducting the procurement shall encourage the entity and the supplier to seek resolution of the 
complaint through consultations’.33  It then sets out requirements on the identity and attributes of the review 
body, and the remedies which it should have at its disposal.   
a) The Identity and Attributes of the Review Body 
Article XVIII:4 provides that, ‘[e]ach Party shall establish or designate at least one impartial administrative 
or judicial authority that is independent of its procuring entities to receive and review a challenge by a 
supplier arising in the context of a covered procurement’. Paragraph 5 goes on to provide that ‘a body other 
than an authority referred to in paragraph 4’ can initially review a challenge’. It may therefore be 
permissible for the procuring entity complained of to initially review the challenge, although this could be 
regarded as an unnecessary procedural formality if the formal complaint was preceded by consultations 
between the aggrieved supplier and the procuring entity. An alternative could therefore be for challenges to 
be initially reviewed by the government entity with oversight of the entity complained of.   
Where there is an initial review by a non-independent authority, Parties must provide for an appeal against 
the initial decision to an impartial administrative or judicial authority.  Paragraph 6 provides that where this 
review body is not a court, it must either be subject to judicial review or operate with what might be 
                                                          
30 Norway – Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim panel report adopted by the Committee on 
Government Procurement 13 May 1992, BISD 40S/319. 
31 Article V:15(e) of the Tokyo Round GPA. 
32 Para. 4.27. 
33 Revised GPA Article XVIII:2. 
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described as ‘court-like’ procedures. Participants must, for example, have the right to be heard prior to a 
decision and have access to all proceedings.  
It is not expressly provided that entities must follow review body recommendations, although this is 
arguably implicit in the need to provide for access to courts or court-like procedures. Some international 
rules are not as strict in this respect.  For example, the North America Free Trade Agreement rule states that 
entities should ‘normally’ follow the recommendations of the review body.34 It is unclear whether this 
position would be acceptable as an implementation of the GPA. This is because reference is made to the 
review body making ‘decisions or recommendations’.35 The use of ‘recommendations’ can be interpreted as 
indicating that the entire content of the review body report can be non-binding. However, this interpretation 
is difficult to accept bearing in mind that review procedures must be ‘effective’. A possible intermediate 
interpretation would that the decision on whether the rules have been breached must be binding, while 
recommendations on how to remedy the situation can be non-binding. However, this interpretation would 
make the GPA less strict than the 2011 Model Law whose Article 67.9 refers to ‘decisions’ as opposed also 
to recommendations, and gives a strong impressions that the content of these decisions is binding through 
use of language such as ‘prohibit’, ‘require’ and ‘overturn’.  
For a couple of reasons, the minimum requirements described above arguably provide less protection to 
aggrieved suppliers than the equivalent rules in the previous text. The GPA 1994 did not envisage the 
possibility of initial review of a challenge by a body other than an impartial administrative or judicial 
authority. It will be interesting to see whether the country studies comment on the incidence and efficacy of 
this procedural step.36 It occurs to me that it could be viewed by suppliers as either an unwanted hurdle, or as 
an opportunity to ‘nip the matter in the bud’.37 A second aspect which arguably reduces the level of 
protection relates to the attributes of the review body. As noted, the Revised GPA requires Parties to 
‘designate at least one impartial administrative or judicial authority that is independent of its procuring 
entities’. The previous text was more fulsome in requiring that challenges, ‘ be heard by a court or by an 
impartial and independent review body with no interest in the outcome of the procurement and the members 
of which are secure from external influence during the term of appointment’.38 On this change, Arie Reich 
comments that, ‘[n]ot only is the exact nature of such independence not elaborated in the Revised Text but it 
also ignores the need to ensure that the body’s members are secure from other external influence, such as 
influence from competing suppliers’.39 This may slightly overstate the problem as a review body whose 
members could be subject to influence by competing suppliers would not be impartial. However, I am 
inclined to agree that there was no need to streamline the old language.  
A final observation here is that it remains permissible under a minimal GPA implementation to keep review 
out of the courts. It is permissible under the GPA for the appeal to be to an impartial administrative authority 
operating under ‘court-like’ procedures. The question raised is whether this is consistent with the UNCAC 
which requires an ‘effective system of domestic review, including an effective system of appeal’. It is 
                                                          
34 NAFTA Article 1017:1(l). 
35 Revised GPA, Article XVIII:6(f). 
36 The Model Law Guide indicates that there are different state practices in this area: ‘Some States are more flexible by not 
requiring the supplier or contractor to exhaust the challenge mechanism at the procuring entity before filing an application 
before the independent body or the court.’  Page 237, para. 7. 
37 The Guide elaborates on both possible perceptions. Review by the procuring entity itself may, ‘facilitate a swift, simple 
and relatively low-cost procedure, which can avoid unnecessarily burdening other forums with applications and appeals that 
might have been resolved by the parties at an earlier, less disruptive stage, and with lower costs’. On the other hand, it is also 
noted that, ‘procuring entities [sometimes] simply ignore the request, and submitting one operates in practice merely to delay 
a formal application in another forum’. Page 230, para. 11. 
38 GPA 1994, Article XX.6. 
39 A. Reich ‘The new text of the Agreement on Government Procurement: An Analysis and Assessment’ 12 Journal of 
International Economic Law (2009) 989 at 1015. 
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submitted that the possibility of appeal to the courts is not required. The Guide to Enactment to the Model 
Law 2011 gives the impression that this would be inconsistent with the legal traditions of states with 
established systems of review in non-judicial independent bodies.40 In such states, the effective system of 
appeal could be from the procuring entity itself to the independent body, or within the independent body. 
However, this matter is not free from doubt as indicated by the following statement from the UNCITRAL 
Guidance on Procurement Regulations (2013):  
…the procurement regulations must be compliant with the international obligations of the enacting 
State, including under the United Nations Convention against Corruption (New York, 31 October 
2003) and the WTO GPA, which may require them to ensure effective appeal to an independent body 
and that decisions of any review body that is not a court be open to judicial review.41  
b) Remedies   
Article XVIII:7 Each Party shall adopt or maintain procedures that provide for: 
(a) rapid interim measures to preserve the supplier's opportunity to participate in the procurement.  
Such interim measures may result in suspension of the procurement process.  The procedures may 
provide that overriding adverse consequences for the interests concerned, including the public 
interest, may be taken into account when deciding whether such measures should be applied.  Just 
cause for not acting shall be provided in writing; and 
(b) where a review body has determined that there has been a breach or a failure as referred to in 
paragraph 1, corrective action or compensation for the loss or damages suffered, which may be 
limited to either the costs for the preparation of the tender or the costs relating to the challenge, or 
both. 
The rationale for rapid interim measures is that if the procurement process is permitted to continue during 
the challenge procedures, the final remedy is unlikely to be very helpful in terms of encouraging suppliers to 
complain, and deterring breaches. This is because a contract might be concluded or even performed during 
the review procedure. Should these events be permitted to occur, any remedy other than a declaration that a 
breach has occurred becomes unlikely because of prejudice to the successful supplier and the public interest 
in the prompt delivery of government functions. In contrast, if the procurement process can be suspended at 
an early stage, the possibility of re-commencement being ordered is preserved.   
The language in paragraph (a) above could be more prescriptive without clashing with prevailing legal 
traditions. In particular, the language could indicate that review bodies must have the power to suspend the 
procurement process at any point until the conclusion of a procurement contract subject to taking account of 
the ‘overriding adverse consequences’ referred to. However, it would probably be a step too far to require 
that review bodies be empowered to suspend the performance of a contract. This is envisaged only as a 
possible option in the Model Law 2011.42  
As regards the final remedies envisaged by the paragraph (b) above, it is reasonably clear that review bodies 
must have both remedies (correction and compensation) at their disposal, again, on the basis that ‘effective’ 
challenge procedures are required. Of these two remedies, corrective action will generally be by far the most 
                                                          
40 Guide Page 231, para. 15.  
41 Guide Page 61, para. 4. 
42 Article 67.3. 
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important, given that the compensation remedy can permissibly be a limited one.43 Corrective action might 
involve preventing the procuring entity from following a non-compliant procedure and requiring it to 
proceed in a compliant manner. It could also extend to overturning the award of a wrongfully awarded 
contract when this possibility is recognized in the jurisdiction in question.  
The GPA’s minimum requirements for domestic review procedures have been criticized as insufficiently 
strong and prescriptive. However, they are minimum requirements and there is nothing to prevent states 
from applying more robust procedures. Also, the GPA has to be a reasonably good fit for many jurisdictions. 
Prescriptive language could make it difficult for some states to comply even when they provide for an 
overall system which is effective.  
4. Supporting the participation of SMEs in procurement 
Taking a step back from the new Work Programme on SMEs, it is worth sketching the different 
perceptions on the nature of the problems and challenges in this area. The different perceptions 
have a common origin. National policies to support SMEs and, more broadly, enterprises owned 
by historically disadvantaged individuals (HDIs), tend to be discriminatory. From here, 
perceptions split off in two directions. On one view, the discrimination is problematic and the 
challenge is to remove it. The opposing perception views the discrimination as an intractable, 
necessary and justifiable aspect of the social policy. The challenge is not to remove the 
discrimination, but rather to assess how the GPA can better accommodate these policies with a 
view to expanding its membership. The SME Work Programme appears to be focused on the 
former perception.     
The intention is to consider, ‘best practice with respect to measures and policies that the parties use 
to support the participation of SMEs in government procurement’.44 Glancing at the relevant 
Decision,45 it is immediately apparent that the Work Programme views policies which discriminate 
in favour of domestic SMEs as undesirable, thereby reinforcing the GPA’s primary rationale. The 
second paragraph provides:  
Avoidance of Discriminatory SME Measures: The Parties shall avoid introducing 
discriminatory measures that favour only domestic SMEs and shall discourage the 
introduction of such measures and policies by acceding Parties. 
 
Reference is later made to a SME survey and to the implementation of the outcome of this survey. 
However, the wording implies that SME policies which favour only domestic SMEs cannot qualify 
as best practice:    
4.2 Implementation of the Outcome of the SME Survey 
(a) The Parties shall promote the adoption of the best practices identified in the assessment 
of the survey to encourage and facilitate participation of SMEs of the Parties in government 
procurement. 
                                                          
43 It notable that the Israel-Mexico Free Trade Agreement provides that compensation ‘shall [rather than may] be limited to 
costs for tender preparation or protest.’ Article 6.17.7(c). The Model Law 2011 also envisages this formulation as a possible 
implementation of its Article 67.9(i). 
44 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/gpa_wk_prog_e.htm visited November 2014. 
45 Appendix 2, Annex C of Adoption of the Results of the Negotiations under Article XXIV:7 of the Agreement on 
Government Procurement, Following their Verification and Review, as Required by the Ministerial Decision of 15 
December 2011 (GPA/112), paragraph 5, GPA/113, 2 April 2012. 
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(b) With respect to other measures, the Committee shall encourage the Parties that maintain 
such measures to review them with a view to eliminating them or applying them to the 
SMEs of the other Parties. These Parties shall inform the Committee about the outcome of 
the review. (emphasis added) 
Accepting that the Work Programme is about fostering SME participation while also removing 
discrimination, there are a number of related queries. The first relates to its narrowness or breadth 
since states can have different perceptions of what is meant by SME participation. A second query 
is whether there are plausible rationales for promoting SME participation. Why, if at all, is this 
important? A third query is whether it is realistic to expect much progress in removing or reducing 
the discriminatory content of SME policies.  
On the first query, some states pursue SME participation in a direct and literal sense based on 
measurements broadly related to the size of enterprises.46 States also pursue SME participation 
indirectly or incidentally, for example, because relatively small enterprises are disproportionately 
owned by HDIs. While the Work Programme refers only to SMEs, the possibility of a broad remit 
should not be excluded at this early stage. In the envisaged survey, Parties will be required to 
indicate how they define SMEs, and what ‘economic, social, and other goals’ are pursued. It is 
possible that some GPA Parties, the US in particular, will highlight that some of its policies are 
directed towards minority owned enterprises. Perhaps the likelihood, however, is that the Work 
Programme will be restricted to national policies which define SMEs with reference to size as 
opposed to ownership parameters. This is because the Work Programme applies to current GPA 
Parties, among whom SME participation in the direct and literal sense in more prevalent than 
policies supporting companies owned by HDIs. This tends to be more closely associated with 
states which are not yet GPA Parties such as South Africa and Malaysia (which has observer 
status). It may be that the focus on SME participation in the narrow sense is a sensible starting 
point before consideration of social policies more broadly. There is more potential for agreement 
on what a SME is when only size parameters are considered. Also, there may be more scope for 
removing discrimination when SME participation is understood in the narrow sense (as discussed 
further below).  
What are the rationales for promoting SME participation? As John Linarelli asks: 
Why should law and public policy allocate scarce resources to SMEs? Why not let the 
capital markets decide which businesses should succeed and which not? Why is government 
intervention beyond that of supporting efficient capital markets necessary to support 
SMEs?47  
Based on a review of the literature, Linarelli identifies a number of possible economic arguments 
in favour of policies to assist SMEs in general. Competition and entrepreneurship can be enhanced 
with benefits for economy wide efficiency, innovation and aggregate productivity. The industrial 
base can be broadened thereby countering monopolistic practices. SMEs may also be more 
productive than larger enterprises and more labour intensive with greater potential to alleviate 
poverty. Suffice it to say that these are not uncontested arguments. Linarelli proceeds to review the 
studies of SME preference policies in procurement, finding some evidence that they can enhance 
                                                          
46 For a discussion of the various methods for defining small businesses and SMEs in the EU and US, see, Max V. Kidalov, 
"Small Business Contracting in the United States and Europe: A Comparative Assessment" (2011) 40 Public Contract Law 
Journal 445. 
47 J. Linarelli ‘The limited case for permitting SME procurement preferences in the Agreement on Government Procurement’ 
in Arrowsmith and Anderson (eds.) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement 444 at 447. 
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competition by encouraging other firms to bid more aggressively in order to overcome preferences 
and win contracts. Of course, the possibility of enhanced competition is more strongly associated 
with SME preferences than set-asides.  
While there may be commercial rationales for SME preferences (they may enhance value of 
money), the stronger tenet of Linarelli’s work is to argue that there are more important social 
justice and human rights rationales especially in the context of enterprises owned by HDIs: 
Distributive justice and economic efficiency may work at cross-purposes. A social 
arrangement may be efficient and yet fundamentally unjust. Let us assume that governments 
only focus their attention on transaction costs and reducing barriers to entry in government 
procurement. Facilitating the operation of markets in government procurement does not 
‘guarantee’ fair participation in those markets by SMEs and HDIs. It might be efficient to 
only have large multinational enterprises, which have the benefits of economies of scale and 
low-cost global supply chains, providing bundled goods and services to government, 
regardless of the national origins of these goods and services, and regardless of the working 
conditions or wages paid for these goods and services to labour, and regardless of ownership 
of these firms, and so on. Governments, however, have duties that go beyond efficiency in 
procurement. They have duties of justice. While all social institutions are required to meet 
the demands of justice, a government as a buyer is a special role to promote justice; it is now 
well accepted that governments can and do use procurement as a social policy tool.48  
In sum, SME participation can, at the same time, promote strictly economic goals and broader 
social justice goals. However, there is a compelling argument that social justice goals stand alone 
and can be legitimately pursued independently of economic goals.  
The third query is whether it is realistic to expect much progress in removing the discriminatory 
content of SME policies. Do states wish to continue pursuing discriminatory SME policies outside 
of GPA coverage by way of negotiated derogations, or do they perceive that the benefits of these 
policies can be achieved even when the discrimination is removed? 
Preferences and set-asides in favour of domestic SMEs are de jure discriminatory and contrary to 
the national treatment principle in Article V:1 of the GPA. This is because the nationality based 
discrimination is indisputable from the face of the measure. All foreign firms are ineligible, while 
some domestic firms are eligible. This discrimination could be removed by extending eligibility to 
all SMEs of the GPA Parties. A common definition of a SME would help in aiding understanding 
of eligibility, but this is not strictly necessary in order to remove discrimination. Eligibility of all 
enterprises of the GPA Parties meeting national criteria would be de jure non-discriminatory and 
probably also de facto non-discriminatory. The extended eligibility removes the explicit 
differentiation between domestic and foreign suppliers. On de facto discrimination, foreign 
suppliers as a group (foreign SMEs and non-SMEs) are treated no less favourably than domestic 
suppliers as a group (domestic SMEs and non-SMEs).49 An additional observation is that the point 
made earlier when contrasting the GPA and Model Law applies here. Divergent national rules on 
the definition of a SME can all be non-discriminatory and, therefore, of limited directed concern 
                                                          
48 Ibid., at 452 (notes omitted). 
49 In WTO law, it is now firmly established that a group comparison applies as opposed to an approach which has been 
variously termed individual or diagonal comparison or best treatment. Under this (discredited) approach, there could be de 
facto discrimination on the basis that there is a foreign non-SME which is treated less favourably than a domestic SME. This 
area is the subject of the author’s forthcoming work which compares the choice between group comparison and best 
treatment in the trade and investment law context.  
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under the GPA. However, divergent definitions could still have a chilling effect on international 
trade of more direct concern under the Model Law.   
Of course, any discussion of what steps would remove discrimination must consider the 
practicalities and political considerations. Reaching a common definition of a SME among GPA 
Parties is probably unrealistic by reason of the volume of variables. Individual states may have 
different definitions for different types of industries and procurement contracts50 and it might be 
regarded as incomplete to consider the positions of only existing Parties as opposed to also future 
accessions. Furthermore, the formulation and enforcement of SME recognition rules even at the 
national level can be a formidable challenge.51 Perhaps the most that can be achieved here is a soft 
mutual recognition principle, along the lines of Article 2.7 of the TBT Agreement, under which a 
GPA Party would give positive consideration to recognizing a supplier as a SME when that 
supplier is so recognized in any other Party. The alternative of allowing foreign suppliers to apply 
for SME status under national rules may not be any more realistic. SME preferences and set-asides 
respond to the difficulties encountered in accessing national procurement markets. Suppliers can 
reasonably be expected to apply for recognition under their national rules, but they are unlikely to 
have the resources to apply for recognition under the rules of many other GPA Parties.     
Apart from these practical difficulties, the question is whether it is politically realistic to expect 
states to extend domestic SME preferences and set-asides to foreign suppliers. The perception 
might be that the achievement of the policy is undermined every time a contract is awarded to a 
foreign SME. This need not be the perception if the policy is intended to gradually improve the 
competitiveness of domestic SMEs. Extending the SME preference or set aside to SMEs of all 
GPA Parties would deepen and intensify competition among similarly situated enterprises. 
However, this raises another barrier. States may wish to shelter their SMEs from competition not 
only from larger domestic and foreign enterprises, but also from foreign SMEs. 
When we move beyond SMEs per se, towards enterprises owned by defined national HDIs, the 
desire to reserve the policy’s benefit for the defined enterprises may be overwhelming. Phoebe 
Bolton and Geo Quinot note that, in South Africa, a HDI is defined in regulations ‘to refer to those 
individuals disenfranchised under apartheid, women and the disabled, but in all instances restricted 
to South African citizens’.52 In describing the regulations adopted under the relevant enactment,53 
the authors note the possibility of preference points ‘for being an HDI and/or contracting with an 
HDI’.54 They also note that, under the regulations, ‘preference points … must include preference 
points for equity ownership by HDIs’.55 While these preferences may not be de jure 
discriminatory, because a small number of foreign firms could be eligible, they are certainly de 
facto discriminatory on the basis that the preferences will disproportionately benefit domestic 
suppliers.   
                                                          
50 See Kidalov, above note 46, at 461-465. Of the US position, the author notes that a ‘business concern may be small in one 
industry category and yet large in another’ at 463. 
51 On the development of this process in China, see Fuguo Cao, ‘Building up SME programmes in government procurement 
in China: legal structure, recent developments and the way forward towards the WTO-GPA’ (2013) Public Procurement 
Law Review 211. 
52 P. Bolton and G. Quinot ‘Social Policies in procurement and the Agreement on Government Procurement’ in Arrowsmith 
and Anderson (eds.) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement 459 at 463.   
53 Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act, 2000 (Act No. 5 of 2000). 
54 Preferential Procurement Regulations 2001, regulation  4(2). 
55 Ibid., regulation 13(1). 
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Subsequent to the Bolton and Quinot contribution, revised regulations entered into force in 2011.56 
The new regime is less trade restrictive and less overtly discriminatory than the previous regime, 
and therefore enhances competitive opportunities for foreign firms. The primacy afforded to 
domestic HDI ownership at the award stage has been reduced. Indeed, the terminology has 
changed from HDI to Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE). For contracts up to 
a Rand value of R 1 million, a maximum of 80 points can be awarded for price, and a maximum of 
20 points for the level of attainment of B-BBEE status. Within this 20 points, there are a number of 
elements with different weightings:57 
Ownership    25 points 
Management Control   15 points 
Skills Development   20 points 
Enterprise and Supplier Development 40 points 
Socio-economic development  5 points 
While the first two elements will tend to heavily favour domestic suppliers, the further elements 
are more neutral in terms of the capacity of domestic and foreign suppliers to score highly. As an 
example, the most important component of the Enterprise and Supplier Development element is 
Preferential Procurement on which foreign suppliers could score highly by sub-contracting to high 
level B-BBEE suppliers.  
More than the outgoing regime, the new regime recognizes that pursuing the social policies at 
issue is not necessarily incompatible with awarding contracts to foreign firms. However, the 
revised regime at least could amount to de facto discrimination on the basis that it still 
disproportionately favours domestic suppliers.    
Based on these observations, I am sceptical of the prospects for completely removing the 
discriminatory nature of SME policies, especially when there is a HDI dimension. Having said 
this, it is a worthwhile endeavour to at least explore these prospects. The GPA is an instrument of 
trade liberalization whose central principle is non-discrimination for covered procurement. It 
arguably does not need to shift towards a different role served very well by other instruments such 
as the Model Law which, as noted, applies in principle to all procurement and is not so focused on 
removing discrimination.58 On the other hand, it is also possible to argue that the Work Programme 
does not respond to the GPA’s biggest challenge – that of expanding its membership. A 
recalibrated Work Programme would acknowledge that SME policies are understandably 
discriminatory and focus on how such policies can be better accommodated, in particular, for 
possible future members. The focus would then need to be on matters such as the asymmetry in the 
                                                          
56 Preferential Procurement Regulations 2011, which must be read with the Broad Based Black Economic Empowerment Act 
(53/2003) Codes of Good Practice, Gazette No, 36928, 11 October 2013. 
57 Codes of Good Practice, Statement 000-8.1. 
58 It is clear that the Model Law is designed to accommodate the pursuit of socio-economic policies with discriminatory 
impact. This subject area is discussed in the Guide at pages 4-6. It is noted that through measures envisaged in the Model 
Law’s substantive provisions, ‘procurement may be set aside for particular groups or sectors of the economy, or those 
sectors or groups may receive a preferential treatment in the procurement procedure concerned’. (page 4, para. 13) At the 
same time, the Guide strikes several notes of caution. It highlights, for example, that preferences tend to be more beneficial 
than set asides in terms of fostering the development of protected enterprises. Socio-economic policies are described as 
‘exceptional measures’ because they depart from ‘full and open competition’. The danger of suppliers artificially remaining 
as SMEs is mentioned as is the importance of remaining in conformity with international obligations including the GPA.   
16 
 
capacity of large and small economies to negotiate for derogations, and the possibility of allowing 
GPA Parties to justify discriminatory policies on any legitimate public policy ground as opposed to 
the closed list of exceptions in Article III:2.         
5. Procurement may not be carved out of multilateral rules such as GATT Article III to the 
extent that has been commonly thought 
The questions of whether and how government procurement should be regulated are among the most 
challenging which GATT and WTO negotiators have faced. The sensitivity of the area became clear 
at a very early point in the history of international procurement regulation. It is striking that the 
Suggested Charter for an International Trade Organisation drafted by the United States, and published 
in September 1946, originally proposed that government procurement should be subject to the general 
national treatment obligation.59  However, it quickly became apparent that this would not be possible 
because of the prevalence of discriminatory laws and practices involving preferences for domestic 
suppliers. Indeed the Charter’s initial inclusion of procurement was substituted60 with a derogation 
which survives to this day:  
GATT Article III:8(a) 
The provisions of this Article shall not apply to laws, regulations or requirements governing the 
procurement by governmental agencies of products purchased for governmental purposes and 
not with a view to commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for 
commercial sale.  
This derogation may not be as broad as has generally been thought. The Appellate Body’s message 
in Canada – Renewable Energy is that it will not serve to shelter challenged measures from the 
disciplines of Article III on a blanket or ‘self-judging’ basis. Japan and the EU complained of 
domestic content requirements applicable in the construction of solar and wind power generation 
facilities  in the Feed-in tariff programme (FIT Programme) established by the Ontario Power 
Authority.61 Under the FIT Programme, generators of electricity via renewable sources delivered 
into the Ontario system are paid a guaranteed price under 20 year or 40 year contracts. The 
meeting of minimum domestic content levels are among the conditions for being offered a 
contract. Both Japan and the EU argued inter alia that the domestic content requirements infringed 
the GATT Article III:4 national treatment obligation on the basis that their energy generation 
equipment was being treated less favourably than like products of Ontario origin.62 Canada 
countered that the Article III:8 derogation applied. For Canada, the FIT programme constituted 
‘laws and requirements that govern the procurement of renewable electricity for the governmental 
purpose of securing an electricity supply for Ontario from clean sources, and “not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale”’.63       
                                                          
59 Article 9(1) covered ‘laws and regulations governing the procurement by governmental agencies of supplies for public use 
other than by or for the military establishment’. Available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id=misc/Suggested%20Charter.pdf visited November 2014. 
60 The derogation first appeared in Article 2(5) of the Tentative and Non-Committal Draft Suggested by the Delegation of 
the United States of February 7, 1947, E/PC/T/C.6/W.53. Available at 
http://www.worldtradelaw.net/document.php?id=misc/Draft%202.pdf  
61 This body was established under Ontario’s Electricity Restructuring Act of 2004 as a government agency responsible for 
managing Ontario’s electricity supply.  
62 There was no complaint under the GPA. Canada has not included government agencies in the electricity sector located in 
Ontario in its GPA commitments. 
63 Appellate Body report para. 1.10. 
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The panel ultimately found that the derogation was not available, even though the initial 
indications were favourable towards its application. According to the panel, the FIT Programme 
and the Contracts were ‘laws, regulations or requirements governing the procurement’ of 
electricity. This was because compliance with the local content requirements was a precondition 
for the award of a contract for the procurement of electricity. The local content requirements 
therefore governed the procurement of electricity. The panel then proceeded to the second part of 
the derogation. Was the electricity, ‘purchased for governmental purposes and not with a view to 
commercial resale or with a view to use in the production of goods for commercial sale’? The 
panel considered that a purchase could not be ‘for governmental purposes’ if it was ‘with a view to 
commercial resale’. It proceeded to find that the derogation was not applicable because the 
electricity was purchased ‘with a view to commercial resale’ by reason of the profit made by the 
Government of Ontario from resale of FIT Programme electricity to consumers, and because the 
resales were made in competition with licensed electricity retailers. However, the panel also noted 
that ‘commercial resale’ would not always necessarily involve profit noting that, ‘loss-making 
sales can be, and often are, a part of ordinary commercial activity’.64 The domestic content 
requirements were then confirmed as a GATT Article III:4 violation.  
The Appellate Body’s interpretation of the derogation was narrower than that of the panel. In other 
words, it considered the derogation inapplicable at an earlier stage of the analysis and 
independently of whether the purchase of electricity was ‘with a view to commercial resale’. The 
Appellate Body’s core idea was that the derogation had to be understood in relation to the 
obligations of Article III. The derogation ‘becomes relevant only if there is discriminatory 
treatment of foreign products that are covered by the obligations in Article III, and this 
discriminatory treatment results from laws, regulations, or requirements governing procurement by 
governmental agencies of products purchased’.65 The ‘same discriminatory treatment’ had to be 
considered both under Article III and the derogation. It followed that the term ‘products purchased’ 
in the derogation was tied to the scope of the ‘products’ covered by Article III. This meant that, for 
the derogation to apply, ‘the product of foreign origin [electricity generating equipment] must be in 
a competitive relationship with the product purchased [electricity]’.66 As there was no competitive 
relationship, the discrimination relating to generating equipment in the FIT contracts was not 
covered by the derogation. 
The Appellate Body therefore introduced a condition for the operation of the derogation. The 
imported products allegedly being treated less favourably under Article III must be in a 
competitive relationship with the products purchased. It is not enough (as the panel considered) 
that there is a close relationship between the products discriminated against under Article III and 
the products purchased in the sense that electricity generation equipment is needed to produce 
electricity.  
It is interesting to question the implications of this interpretation – specifically, the extent to which 
it expands the reach of Article III into what might loosely be described as the procurement realm. 
‘Buy-national’ policies have been under the spotlight in recent years following the downturn of 
2008-9 and the increased emphasis on public infrastructure spending. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 200967 was among the most prominent instruments. The Act was passed with 
a provision stipulating that the new Buy American requirements ‘shall be applied in a manner 
                                                          
64 Panel report 7.151. 
65 Appellate Body report para. 5.63. 
66 Appellate Body report para. 5.74. 
67 Public Law No. 111-5, 123 Stat, 115 (17 February 2009). (Recovery Act). 
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consistent with United States obligations under international agreements’.68 Commentators have 
assessed whether the Recovery Act and its implementing federal regulations breach the WTO 
commitments of the US.69 Understandably, the primary focus has been on whether the Recovery 
Act breaches the GPA. It is generally thought that a breach is unlikely. When the contracts are not 
covered by the GPA, the Buy American requirements can be applied while covered contracts are 
exempt from Buy American treatment. With regard to GATT Article III, commentators tend to cite 
the paragraph 8 derogation as exempting government procurement from national treatment. 
However, as a result of Canada – Renewable Energy, it must also be asked whether buy national 
requirements are covered by GATT Article III:4.  
Take the example of a buy national requirement under which steel used in the construction of a 
highway must be of US origin. Such a requirement clearly falls under Article III:4 to the extent 
that it applies since imported steel is treated less favourably than like domestic steel. Arguably, 
Article III:4 does now apply because the Article III:8 derogation may not be available. The product 
being purchased is a highway which is not in a competitive relationship with the steel being 
discriminated against under Article III:4. In contrast, the panel’s approach has the potential of 
extending the derogation to this situation. There is a reasonably strong connection between the 
steel discriminated against under Article III and the highway construction project which cannot be 
completed without steel. Continuing with the other main element of the derogation, the purchase of 
the highway would clearly not be ‘with a view to commercial resale’ so that, under the panel’s 
analysis, the buy national requirement in relation to the steel would fall under the derogation. 
Of course, it would be rather surprising if buy national requirements are not covered by the 
derogation. The original Buy American Act was passed in 1933 and it is reasonable to suppose that 
GATT Article III:8 was incorporated in order to shelter this instrument and comparable 
instruments / policies maintained by other states from review under Article III.  
In the example above, in order for the derogation to apply, a more refined view would need to be 
taken of what product is purchased. While the final aim of the procurement is to provide a 
highway, it could still be argued that the project involves the purchase of steel. Unlike the 
generating equipment, there would be transfer of ownership to the government of the steel which is 
physically incorporated into the highway. Furthermore, the invitation to tender could set out the 
specification of the steel to be used and bids would specifically indicate the price of the steel 
component of the highway project. As such, it is reasonable to think in terms of one of the 
products being purchased as steel. There would then be commonality between the products 
discriminated against and the products purchased brining the buy national requirement within the 
derogation. At the same time, however, the project is ultimately about building a highway as 
opposed to purchasing steel leading us to wonder how a panel or the Appellate Body would refine 
the Canada – Renewable Energy test in a subsequent case.      
In the context of NAFTA Chapter 11 investor state dispute settlement, the tribunal in ADF v 
United States70 confirmed that a highway construction project in which Buy American 
requirements were applied in relation to steel was covered by a derogation. However, the 
reasoning and outcome here cannot be automatically applied in the GATT / WTO context because 
both the substantive obligations and the derogation are drafted in different terms. NAFTA Article 
                                                          
68 Recovery Act Section 1605(d). 
69 J. Linarelli, ‘Global Procurement Law in Times of Crisis: New Buy American Policies and Options in the WTO Legal 
System’ in Arrowsmith and Anderson (eds.) The WTO Regime on Government Procurement 773. 
70 ICSID ARB(AF)/00/1, Award 9 January 2003. 
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1108(7) and (8) provides that several substantive obligations such as National Treatment, Most-
Favored-Nation Treatment and Performance Requirements ‘do not apply to procurement by a 
Party or a state enterprise’. The very brevity of this derogation means that there are fewer express 
elements which must be satisfied compared to GATT Article III:8. It does not, for example, 
expressly provide that the products purchased must be for the benefit or use of government, albeit 
that it is arguable that this concept is inherent to the ordinary meaning of ‘procurement’. It may 
therefore be that the NAFTA derogation can shelter a measure from review under Chapter 11, 
when the same measure would not be sheltered from review in WTO proceedings under GATT 
Article III.    
It is possible that this very issue (the scope of the GATT and NAFTA procurement derogations) 
will be considered in Mesa Power v Canada71 in which an American investor is challenging the 
measures at issue in Canada – Renewable Energy. The claimant in Mesa contends that the WTO 
Appellate Body’s reasoning should be carried over to the NAFTA Chapter 11 procurement 
derogation. It therefore considers that the NAFTA derogation can only apply when the goods being 
procured are identical to the goods subject to domestic content provisions.72 Of course, this is was 
not the test established by the Appellate Body since it is well established that non-identical 
products can be in a competitive relationship. Canada’s position is that the plain language of the 
NAFTA derogation does not envisage so tight a nexus between the product discriminated against 
and the product purchased.73 Indeed, Canada goes so far as to argue that the derogation could not 
possibly be interpreted as not applying to domestic content requirements. Given that ‘the majority 
of the world’s nations discriminate in their government procurement’, had the NAFTA Parties 
intended for the Chapter 11 investment obligations to cover domestic content requirements in 
government procurement, they would have expressly so provided.74  
It will be interesting to see what the Mesa tribunal makes of these arguments. One point is 
reasonably certain. If the tribunal follows the methodology of many previous NAFTA Chapter 11 
tribunals, it will at least engage with the WTO law position. The Award ought therefore to further 
elucidate on the relationship between the trade law and investment law regimes.  
A final point here is that one of Canada’s statements in Mesa is particularly striking. It notes that, 
in the ADF case, ‘the state of Virginia was not procuring steel, and it certainly was not procuring 
the process by which steel was manufactured; it was procuring the construction of a highway 
interchange’.75 As noted above, if this was indeed what was being purchased, the GATT Article 
III:8 derogation would not shelter a Buy American requirement in relation to steel from review 
under Article III:4. There is no competitive relationship between a highway and steel.  
To conclude on the doctrinal development in Canada – Renewable Energy, the Appellate Body’s 
approach has the potential to bring swathes of discriminatory domestic content requirements, many 
of which may be excluded from the GPA’s coverage, within the scope of GATT Article III. If this 
is not going to occur, a retreat towards the panel’s overruled reasoning seems to be inevitable. The 
procurement of a highway which involves discrimination against imported steel falls under the 
Article III:8 derogation because (based on the panel’s approach) there is a close, albeit non-
                                                          
71 As of November 2014, the case is at the hearing stage. The submissions are available at: 
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competitive, relationship between the subject matter of the procurement and the products 
discriminated against.       
6. Conclusion 
The idea of a ‘global revolution’ in international procurement regulation may never have been 
more apt. The Revised GPA with its increased contract coverage has finally entered into force. 
During the same time frame, another major international instrument, the UNCITRAL Model Law 
has been revised. At the preferential trade agreement level, the negotiations towards a Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and US are on-going. In this context, reference 
has been made to both coverage commitments and new disciplines going beyond the GPA.76  
Within this on-going process, the GPA’s distinctive features are that it concentrates on trade 
liberalization and market access as between a significant and growing body of Parties with 
enforcement and remedies primarily via domestic challenge procedures. Going forward, the most 
significant challenge is likely to be to maintain and enhance the GPA’s relevance for an 
increasingly diverse membership. While there will continue to be difficult tensions to reconcile, 
there is every reason for optimism in light of recent developments and a sense of significant 
momentum.     
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